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Products Liability in Kentucky: The
Doctrinal Dilemma
By KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY*
In products liability law, many courts have struggled with
practical problems created by the applicability of both implied
warranty and tort theories of recovery. In this article, Professor
Brickey examines several Kentucky products liability decisions
which apply the standards of Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A to actions pleaded in warranty. In criticizing the present
Kentucky approach, the author reviews the standards of liabil-
ity under each theory and the various approaches employed by
other courts to determine which theory will govern a particular
case. Professor Brickey concludes that judicially adopted tort
theories cannot pre-empt the comprehensive legislative reme-
dies of the U. C.C. and that there should exist two distinct but
parallel theories of recovery.
I. INTRODUCTION
Products liability is the name given an area of law which
allows a purchaser injured by a defective product to recover
damages from a remote seller.' Generally, injured purchasers
have predicated liability on one of two theories: implied war-
ranty under the Uniform Commercial Code or strict liability in
tort. Regardless of which theory recovery is based upon, the
policy objectives remain the same; yet, the two theories are
distinguishable.
2
In 1966, in Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distributing
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville. Visitor, Washington Uni-
versity School of Law, 1976-77; A.B. 1965, University of Kentucky; J.D. 1968, Univer-
sity of Kentucky.
W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1964). For recent scholarly treat-
ment of various products liability issues, see, e.g., Cohen, Product Design and Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, 61 MAss. L.Q. 103 (1976); Deane, Industrial
Toxicology: A New Frontier for Products Liability, 11 TRIAL LAW. Q. 36 (1975); Juenger
& Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE ST. L. REv. 39 (1975);
Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation, and the Industrial Accident,
14 DuQ. L. REv. 349 (1976); and Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257 (1976).
2 See generally note 13 infra.
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Co., 3 the Kentucky Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A4 and recognized strict liability in tort
in a products liability context. Even though the plaintiff in
that case sought to impose liability on the basis of an implied
warranty, the Court felt that "the pragmatic view impels us to
recognize that recovery against a remote vendor . . .even
when based on implied warranty, truly sounds more in tort
than contract."' Thus, the Kentucky Court took the first step
toward equating implied warranty and tort liability in a single
doctrine of products liability.'
More recently, in 1975, the union of the two theories was
consummated in McMichael v. American Red Cross.7 In this
case the plaintiff claimed that blood he received in a transfu-
sion had been infected with serum hepatitis and that as a result
he contracted the disease. The suit was based upon breach of
implied warranties of merchantability' and fitness for a partic-
402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
402 S.W.2d at 445.
6 In addition, see Allen v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1966).
532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975).
U.C.C. § 2-314 reads:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving
for value of food or drink to the consumer either on the premises or elsewhere
is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
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ular purpose,' and upon Restatement Section 402A strict liabil-
ity. At the conclusion of plaintiff's opening statement, the trial
court directed a verdict for the defendant on the strength of
Kentucky Revised Statutes § 139.125.1' Citing that statute for
the proposition that the distribution of whole blood does not
constitute a sale, the trial court concluded that this essential
element of both the warranty and tort causes of action was
lacking.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the directed verdict on a
different basis. Since the parties stipulated that at the time the
transfusion was given the presence of hepatitis virus in the
blood was undetectable and could not be eliminated, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the basis
of comment k to Restatement § 402A. Comment k recognizes
that some products, such as certain vaccines, are "unavoidably
unsafe" and that sellers of these products should not be held
strictly liable for consequences incidental to their use." In
applying comment k, the Court stated:
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all
units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
I U.C.C. § 2-315 reads:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under [Section 2-316] an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
'1 Ky. REv. STAT. § 139.125 [hereinafter cited as KRS] provides in pertinent part:
"The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma, blood prod-
ucts, blood derivatives and other human tissue. . . is declared not to be a sale ....
The plaintiff argued that this statute was inapplicable since it was compiled in a
chapter relating to sales and use taxes.
" RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment k, states in relevant part:
Unauoidably unsafe products. There are some products which in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe
for their intended and ordinary use . . . .An outstanding example is the
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to
very serious or damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease
1977]
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We do not find it necessary to discuss. . . whether. . . the
transfer of donor blood by Red Cross to a hospital for a service
fee is a sale under the Uniform Commercial Code . . . so as
to give rise to an implied warranty. . . . Our conclusion is
that. . . even if the transfer be deemed a sale and Red Cross
a seller . . . the" blood involved in the instant case, to the
extent that it may have contained hepatitis virus, was una-
voidably unsafe as discussed in Comment k under Section
402A of the Restatement and for that reason it was not unrea-
sonably dangerous within the terms of Section 402A and it
did not fail to be fit within the Uniform Commercial Code,
KRS 355.2-314, 355.2-315.12
Remarkably, the McMichael Court applied comment k not
only to the strict liability provisions of Restatement § 402A for
which it was intended but also to the implied warranty provi-
sions of the U.C.C. Although the Court did not determine if the
transaction was even within the scope of Article Two, it found
that since the blood was not unreasonably dangerous for pur-
poses of Section 402A, it was likewise not unmerchantable by
the standards articulated in U.C.C. § 2-314. This fusion of
standards of product acceptability under strict liability in tort
and the implied warranties represents a further step of the
Court toward the inextricable intertwining of the two theories.
The Kentucky Court has ignored some fundamental substan-
tive and procedural distinctions between tort and warranty
liability.
13
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use
of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidably high de-
gree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous ... [and a seller] is not to be held to strict liabil-
ity for unfortunate consequences attending [its] use ....
12 532 S.W.2d at 9.
" To treat the two theories as interchangeable ignores at least six fundamental
substantive and procedural differences between them. First, while U.C.C. § 2-314 and
Restatement § 402A both impose liability upon sellers of goods without proof of fault,
strict liability in tort arises only when it is proved that the product left the seller's
hands in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, consumer, or to his
property. In contrast, a product is deemed unmerchantable under U.C.C. § 2-314 if it
contains a defect which presents no peril to person or property. Or the product may
not even be "defective" in the common sense of the word. Proof that goods are unsafe
for purposes of Restatement § 402A will probably establish unmerchantable quality,
but the converse is not necessarily true. Second, warranty liability extends to a broader
[Vol. 65
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H. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE CURRENT APPROACH: SOME
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Scope of the Two Theories
In McMichael, the Court declined to consider the thresh-
old scope provisions of Article Two of the U.C.C. but neverthe-
less proceeded to dismiss the warranty claims on the basis of
comment k. A careful consideration of the scope and policy of
sales law would provide a better foundation for the develop-
ment of a cogent body of case law in this area.
The basic scope language of U.C.C. § 2-102 provides that
unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of the
sales article apply to transactions in goods. Although the term
"transaction" is not defined by the Code, 14 it is clear from the
official commentary that the scope provisions need not be in-
terpreted narrowly, at least with respect to warranties.
[T]he warranty sections of this Article are not designed in
any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have
recognized that warranties need not be confined ... to sales
contracts .... They may arise in other appropriate
circumstances. . . . [It is] the intention that the policies of
this Act may offer useful guidance in dealing with further
cases as they arise. 5
When read in conjunction with other Code policies which seek
to simplify and clarify sales law, facilitate the continued ex-
class of injuries than personal injury or property damage, the only compensable harms
under the strict liability theory. Third, warranties may be disclaimed or modified by
sellers and damages liquidated or remedies limited pursuant to §§ 2-718 and 2-719.
But limiting liability under strict liability in tort is not allowed. Fourth, a seller's
warranties extend to a limited class of third-party beneficiaries under § 2-318. In strict
liability in tort, a seller is liable to the ultimate user or consumer, and in many
jurisdictions to a bystander whose injury is reasonably forseeable. Fifth, an injured
party who fails to notify a seller of a breach within a reasonable time after the breach
was discovered is barred from recovery by § 2-607(3) (a), but there is no such condition
for a § 402A tort action. Sixth, and finally, warranty actions may be brought within
four years following breach, which ordinarily occurs upon tender of delivery. U.C.C. §
2-725. Personal injury actions on the other hand, must be brought within one year of
the date of injury, and actions for injury to personal property must be commenced
within five years after they accrue. KRS §§ 413.120 and 413.130. These distinctions
are obscured by the present approach of the Kentucky Court.
1 U.C.C. § 2-102 does, however, specifically exempt secured transactions from the
coverage of Article Two.
is U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 2.
1977]
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pansion of commercial practices, and promote liberal construc-
tion of Code provisions,"6 this comment encourages, in certain
mercantile settings, an expansive interpretation of Article Two
warranty provisions. Similarly, another comment states:
[S]ince [the Code] is intended to be a semi-permanent
piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for ex-
pansion of commercial practices. It is intended to make it
possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by
the courts in the light of unforseen and new circumstances
and practices."
Some jurisdictions have followed these comments and
have extended Article Two by analogy to transactions which
resemble a simple sale but which are nevertheless character-
ized as something other than a sale. 8 Other courts, however,
have limited the scope of statutory sales law in genuine sales
and sales-related transactions by focusing upon whether the
dominant purpose of the transaction is the sale of goods or the
rendition of services.'9
The majority of courts confronted with the issue of
whether supplying blood for transfusions constitutes a sale
have adopted a limited construction of Article Two and have
concluded that such transactions are outside its scope, so no
warranties arise.20 These courts view the bargain as one for
health services in which furnishing blood is incidental to the
, See U.C.C. § 1-102.
' Id., comment 1.
" See generally cases cited in note 33 infra.
" If the principal object of the contract is not the sale of goods, then the contract
is not governed by Article Two. See, e.g., Schenectady Steel Co. v. Bruno Trimpoli
Gen. Const. Co., 350 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1974), afl'd 316 N.E.2d 875, 359 N.Y.S.2d 560
(1974); Robertson v. Ceola, 501 S.W.2d 764 (Ark. 1973). But see Buckeye Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 196 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. 1972); Worrell v. Barnes, 484
P.2d 573 (Nev. 1971); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 246 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1968), aff'd 258
A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
" See, e.g., St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 534 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1975); Foster v.
Memorial Hosp. Assoc. of Charleston, 219 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975); Lovett v. Emory
Univ., Inc., 156 S.E.2d 923 (Ga. App. 1967); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memo-
rial Blood Bank, Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1965); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood
Center, Inc., 127 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1964); Goetz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research
Inst. & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves
Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 364 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1961); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp.
Dist., 296 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1956); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792
(N.Y. 1954).
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performance of the service. 21 If the McMichael Court had used
this theory to resolve the case, there would have been no reason
for construing the merchantability standards of U.C.C. § 2-314.
As another option, the Kentucky Court could have found
that supplying blood for a transfusion did qualify as a transac-
tion within the scope of Article Two. Courts adopting this mi-
nority position have held that a supplier of blood may be liable
in warranty, either by determining that the transaction is a sale
rather than a service, 22 or by holding that warranty liability
may exist regardless of whether the transaction is characterized
as a sale or a service.? The Kentucky Court chose not to exam-
ine whether the transaction was within the scope of Article
Two, but it nevertheless interpreted the warranty provisions of
the sales article. The Court found that there was no breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability on the questionable
basis that under tort principles the product was not unreason-
ably dangerous.
2, Although blood transfusions involve a transfer of personal property, these courts
do not view every transfer as a sale.
[W]here an individual contracts for professional services involving an inci-
dental transfer of personal property as a necessary part of such service, and
where the appropriate use of such personal property depends primarily upon
the skill and judgment of the person rendering the service, such a transfer
of personal property by the professional is not within the contemplation of
[U.C.C. §§ 2-314 and 2-315] and any injury or damage resulting from such
transferred personal property must be recovered by an action grounded in
negligence and not by an action grounded in warranty.
Foster v. Memorial Hosp. Assoc. of Charleston, 219 S.E.2d 916, 921-22 (W. Va. 1975).
Moreover, as a matter of policy it has been deemed necessary to lower the standard of
care in such cases because of the circumstances under which transfusions frequently
are given. "Otherwise the hospital leaves the healing business and enters the insurance
business." 219 S.E.2d at 921.
22 Rostocki v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973);
Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). These cases are
limited by the enactment of a statute defining such transactions as services if the
defect is undetectable or unremovable. FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1962).
2 Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 267 A.2d 867 (Pa. 1970). In Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970), the Illinois court held that a
supplier of blood is engaged in the business of selling for purposes of imposing strict
liability. This court found no reason to distinguish cases involving food for human
consumption from those involving whole blood, pointing out that neither warranty nor
strict tort is based upon fault. The argument against imposing liability upon charitable
organizations which supply vital medical services was found unpersuasive in
Cunningham. The court noted that charitable hospitals are one of the biggest busi-
nesses in the country.
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There are two problems with the methodology in
McMichael. First, the Court offered little insight into the pro-
per scope of statutory sales law, or its relationship to judicially
adopted strict liability in tort theory. Second, the construction
of the implied warranty provision was based on strong policy
considerations peculiar to the allocation of unavoidable risks in
connection with the performance of this vital health service. 4
The considerations favoring protection of the supplier in this
context are unique and should not operate to restrict the defini-
tion of merchantability in other contexts. Aside from avoiding
an undesirable interpretation of Code warranty provisions,
careful consideration of the scope of Article Two would serve
several important functions. It would clarify the status of a
personal injury action which is grounded in warranty, resolve
obvious conflicts between warranty and strict liability theories,
and establish an analytical framework for deciding warranty
actions regardless of how the injury is characterized.
If one rejects the premise of the Kentucky Court that im-
plied warranty and strict liability in tort are "expressions of a
single basic public policy as to liability for defective prod-
ucts," then it becomes necessary to examine each transaction
to determine if one or both of the theories is applicable. Con-
sider, for example, the following hypothetical cases.
Assume that a buyer enters a grocery store to purchase a
carton of soft drinks. The carton selected contains a bottle
which explodes before the buyer reaches the check-out counter,
and the buyer suffers personal injury. In this situation, it is
24 To date, no fewer than 13 jurisdictions have amended the Code to exclude the
supplying of human tissues, blood products or derivatives from the warranty provisions
and the definition of goods. See ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 2-314(4)(Supp. 1973); ALASKA
STAT. § 45.05.100(e)(Supp. 1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-316(3)(d)(Supp. 1975); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5)(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.2-316(5)(Supp. 1977); GA.
CODE ANN. § 109A-2-316(5)(1975); ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (Supp. 1976-
77); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 106, § 2-316(5)(Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-
33(3)(d) (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 57-4-33.1 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-2-316(5)(Supp. 1976); Tax. [Bus. & COMM.] CODE ANN. tit. 1 § 2-
316(e)(Vemon 1968); Wyo. STAT. § 34-2-316(3)(d)(Supp. 1975). A majority of the re-
maining states have enacted other legislation limiting the liability of such suppliers.
For a list of these statutes, see Comment, Blood Transfusions and the Transmission
of Serum Hepatitis: The Need for Statutory Reform, 24 AMER. U.L. REv. 367, 404-05
n.143 (1975).
2 McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Ky. 1975).
[Vol. 65
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clear that the standards of product acceptability would not be
satisfied under either strict liability or warranty theory. Bever-
age containers which explode without any mishandling are nei-
ther safe nor merchantable. A prospective purchaser of goods
has a Section 402A cause of action against the prospective
seller who offers for sale defective goods which cause injury to
a consumer on the premises. 6 In addition, Section 402A would
allow the consumer to recover from the wholesaler or manufac-
turer. Given this breadth of the Section 402A remedy, it may
be virtually exclusive since it would be more difficult for the
injured plaintiff to establish the elements of a warranty cause
of action: the existence of a sales contract containing a war-
ranty, a breach of warranty, and proper notification of the
seller.17 The only circumstance in which pleading warranty
would be to the litigant's advantage in a Section 402A jurisdic-
tion would be if the action were filed more than one year after
the date of injury when the personal injury statute of limita-
tions had expired. In that event, the plaintiff who could suc-
cessfully argue that the elements of an Article Two transaction
were presentH would be entitled to the four-year period of limi-
tation in Section 2-725. Hence, the result in a warranty action
would be different than the result under Section 402A because
21 See Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Lexington, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 703 (Ky.
1975); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967); Rogers v. Karem, 405
S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1966).
" U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
2 Three jurisdictions have held that facts similar to those in this example are
sufficient to support finding a contract for sale and to impose liability under the
warranty provisions of the Code. See Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 691
(Ga. App. 1976); Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 318 A.2d 874 (Md. App. 1974), aff'd
sub. nom. Giant Food v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 A.2d 1 (Md. 1975);
Gillispie v. The Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 187 S.E.2d 441 (N.C. App. 1972).
A self-service grocery store owner who places pre-priced goods on the shelf offers
them for sale. A customer who removes the goods from the shelf with intent to purchase
them has accepted the offer. The fact that the customeris at liberty to change his mind
and return the goods to the shelf does not preclude finding a contract for sale. The
power to terminate the contract other than by breach is created by the agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-106(3). While each of the above cases used these flexible contract formation
principles in order to impose warranty liability, the underlying policy in favor of
recovery is identical to that incorporated in the bystander cases. See cases cited note
39 infra. One who markets a defective product that causes injury should be held
responsible, notwithstanding the absence of a technical sale. The same result could be
found in warranty cases without a strained interpretation of the facts to support the
existence of a sale.
1977]
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of procedural distinctions. Since Article Two expressly pro-
vides for the recovery of consequential damages for personal
injury and damage to property,2 characterizing the injury as
one "sounding in tort" should not be sufficient to thrust the
cause of action outside the scope of Code remedies.
Suppose, however, that recovery under Section 402A is
uncertain. Consider this hypothetical: a consumer visits an
optometry firm. Contact lenses are prescribed, sold and fitted,
and the consumer pays the standard price charged for all pre-
scription lenses. The curvature of the lenses is improper and
they scratch the consumer's cornea. Contact lenses which are
specially manufactured for a particular individual are not "a
finished product offered to the general public in regular chan-
nels of trade," and therefore "[t]he considerations supporting
the rule of strict liability are not present.""0 Also, such a prod-
uct is neither unreasonably dangerous nor unmerchantable in-
sofar as the ordinary user or consumer is concerned." If the
21 See note 34 infra for an explanation of what damages are recoverable in a
warranty action.
Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968). In Barbee, optometrists were
doing business as an optical company. They prescribed, fitted, and sold lenses manu-
factured by another corporation. The optical company employed over a hundred li-
censed optometrists and advertised in newspapers and the broadcast media to promote
the sale of contact lenses. Moreover, the advertisements represented that the lenses
would be properly fitted. According to the testimony of one of the defendants, the
standard price charged was for the lenses and not for the labor of the optometrist. The
price was not affected by the number of examinations required or the complexity of
the eye problem.
In a suit against the optical company and the manufacturer, the jury found that
the lenses were not fit for use in the plaintiff's eyes, but that the company had not
failed to fulfill the representations made in the advertisements. Although the company
was negligent in failing to fit the lenses properly, the negligence was not found to be a
proximate cause of the injury.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the optical company that the jury's find-
ings did not support an implied warranty and therefore limited its opinion to consider-
ation of strict liability in tort. In this court's view, the presence of a professional
relationship between the plaintiff and the company militated against finding tort
liability. The company was not a seller, but rather one licensed to correct visual defects
by prescribing lenses. The injury was not caused by a defect in the lenses themselves,
but by a failure to properly fit the lenses.
A dissenting judge in a lower court noted, however, that reliance upon the superior
skill and judgment of the vendor is the basis for imposing an implied warranty. The
fact that the skill is characterized as "professional" by virtue of a licensing statute does
not exempt the defendant from warranty liability. Texas State Optical, Inc. v. Barbee,
417 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
31 U.C.C. § 2-314 specifies a standard of fitness for the ordinary purpose for which
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lenses are properly ground and polished so that they are in fact
fit for use as eye glasses, then their failure to satisfy the partic-
ular needs of this consumer would be of little consequence
under Section 402A or the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity. But if the transaction is within the scope of Article Two,
the consumer might still recover. It is clear that the consumer
is relying on the optometrist's skill and judgment to furnish
suitable contact lenses and that the optometrist is aware of this
reliance. Thus the consumer might recover under an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 2 As in blood trans-
fusion cases, solving the threshold scope issue involves inter-
mingling professional skills and services with the supplying of
goods. In these types of cases it is important to identify the
elements of the transaction and articulate the underlying poli-
cies of warranty law.
In a third example, a consumer leases an automobile for
temporary use from a rental agency. Shortly thereafter the con-
sumer is injured in an accident caused by defective brakes on
the rental car. An automobile with defective brakes is both
unreasonably dangerous and unmerchantable. Increasing num-
bers of courts have been willing to extend strict tort or warranty
liability to lessors,3 and regardless of which theory is used, the
the goods are used. See note 8 supra. Restatement § 402A, comment i, indicates that
courts should focus upon the danger that goods pose for the average consumer who has
ordinary knowledge regarding the characteristics of the product. Only if the article is
too dangerous for this ordinary consumer is it unreasonably dangerous.
32 See note 9 supra for a reprint of U.C.C. § 2-315, the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.
31 For cases which recognize warranty as a theory of recovery against a lessor, see
Quality Acceptance Corp. v. Million & Albers, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 771 (D. Wyo.
1973)(lease of business machines will create implied warranties, especially where it is
probable that lease will end in purchase); KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elec. Corp., 327
F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Ark. 1971)(lease of electronic equipment creates warranty where
the lessee is responsible for maintenance and repair and has enforceable right to pur-
chase at end of lease term); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 428 S.W.2d 46 (Ark.
1968)(warranty provisions of U.C.C. applicable where lease analogous to sale); W.E.
Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970) (implied warranty
of fitness may arise from lease where lessor deals in goods of the kind and transaction
not an isolated occurrence); Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 215 S.E.2d 10 (Ga.
App. 1975)(court will look to purpose of contract to determine its character and will
apply U.C.C. warranty provisions to prevent merchants from escaping responsibilities
by selling goods under guise of lease); All States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 538 P.2d 1177
(Idaho 1975)(U.C.C. warranty provisions considered statements of public policy con-
cerning commercial transactions, including leases); Baker v. City of Seattle, 484 P.2d
1977]
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rationale recognizes, the growing use of lease agreements as
substitutes for sales in commercial settings and the inability of
the lessee to protect himself by examination of the goods. A
court willing to extend the warranty or strict tort theories in
this example would likely reach the same result under each.
The main distinction between the two theories in this context
is that Section 402A would benefit only the lessee who suffers
personal injury or property damage; so the lessee who suffers
only commercial loss would be denied recovery under Section
402A but could recover under Article Two warranty provi-
sions.1
4
The greatest conflict arises when recovery would be al-
lowed under one theory but not the other. Consider this situa-
tion: A consumer purchases food from a local manufacturer's
retail store. The label on the container carries a conspicuous
disclaimer of warranties, including the warranty of merchanta-
bility. The food is unwholesome and causes the consumer to
become ill. A disclaimer of liability is ineffective in a tort strict
405 (Wash. 1971)(consumer who leases golf cart entitled to protection equivalent to
consumer who purchases). See also Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-
Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957); Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transac-
tions: A Policy Approach, 28 S.W.L.J. 575 (1974). But cf. Bona v. Graefe, 285 A.2d
607 (Md. 1972)(U.C.C. warranty provisions apply only to sales); Garfield v. Furniture
Fair-Hanover, 274 A.2d 325 (N.J. Super. 1971)(even though bailments are contractual
in nature, U.C.C. warranty provisions apply only to contracts of sale). It should be
noted that most of these cases seeking to extend Article Two by analogy have involved
an attempted disclaimer of liability. Courts which have applied the warranty provi-
sions to lease transactions have also held that the § 2-316 limitations on disclaimers
are applicable.
Jurisdictions which extend liability in strict tort to lessors have done so only
insofar as the lessor is in the business of leasing goods. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d
319 (Alas. 1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Whit-
field v. Cooper, 298 A.2d 50 (Conn. Super. 1972); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Corp.,470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii 1970); Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 274 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App.
1971); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972); Hawkins Const. Co. v. Mat-
thews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 251 A.2d
278 (N.J. 1969); and Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
31 U.C.C. § 2-714 permits recovery of the difference between the value of the goods
accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, plus
incidental and consequential damages. In addition to personal and property injuries,
lost profits or other purely economic losses are also compensable. See Midland Forge,
Inc. v. Letts Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Matsushita Elec. Corp.
of America v. Sonus Corp., 284 N.E.2d 880 (Mass. 1972); National Farmers Org., Inc.
v. McCook Feed & Supply Co., 243 N.W.2d 335 (Neb. 1976); and Ford Motor Co. v.
Taylor, 446 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. App. 1969).
THE DOCTRINAL DILEMMA
liability action. The seller is not allowed to disclaim liability
because the Restatement policy allocates the risk of marketing
products to the seller, who presumably will insure against those
risks. 5 The Code, on the other hand, permits disclaimer of all
warranties if the disclaimer satisfies mechanical requirements
such as "conspicuousness"3 and if the disclaimer is not un-
conscionable.37 The theories conflict in this instance, and the
result would differ under each. This dilemma requires consid-
eration of several related issues: To what extent has the legisla-
ture pre-empted the field by adopting the U.C.C.;38 will courts
perceive actions "sounding in tort" to be outside the scope of
Article Two despite its provision of recovery for tortious in-
u RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c. The Kentucky Court has
expressly approved this rationale and has relied upon it as justifying extension of
liability throughout the distributive chain.
Our expressed public policy will be furthered if we minimize the risk of
personal injury and property damage by charging the costs of injuries against
the manufacturer who can procure liability insurance and distribute its ex-
pense among the public as a cost of doing business . . . .As a matter of
public policy the retailer or middleman as well as the manufacturer should
be liable since the loss for injuries resulting from defective products should
be placed on those members of the marketing chain best able to pay the loss,
who can then distribute such risk among themselves by means of insurance
and indemnity agreements.
Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Lexington, 528 S.W.2d 703, 705-06 (Ky. 1975).
31 U.C.C. § 2-316(2) requires that a disclaimer or modification of an implied war-
ranty of merchantability mention the word merchantability. Also, if the attempted
disclaimer is in writing, it must be conspicuous. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) permits other
language or circumstances which clearly indicate that no implied warranties are made
to substitute for mention of the word merchantability. The requirement that a written
disclaimer be conspicuous is designed to protect against overreaching by the seller
since "[t]he warranty of merchantability, wherever it is normal, is so commonly taken
for granted that its exclusion from the contract is a matter threatening surprise and
therefore requiring special precaution." U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 11. Compare Child-
ers & Ventors, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970) with Massey-Ferguson v.
Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1967).
2 The relevant criterion for determining unconscionability is "the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not [the] disturbance of allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power." U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1. While § 2-719(3)
declares that any limitation of consequential damages for personal injury by consumer
goods is unconscionable, "[tihe seller in all cases is free to disclaim warranties ... .
U.C.C. § 2-719, comment 3. Thus, the seller who effectively disclaims the existence of
warranties may avoid liability for all types of harm caused by a defective product.
See generally Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713 (1970); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 509
P.2d 529 (Ore. 1973), special concurrence of O'Connell, C.J., at 537 et seq. In addition,
see text accompanying notes 99-108 infra.
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jury;39 and, is there an absolute option to choose the more fa-
vorable litigation theory? 0
B. To Whom Does Liability Run?
The Restatement (Second) of Torts specifically eliminates
any requirement of privity for the ultimate user or consumer.
While the American Law Institute did not resolve the issue of
a seller's liability to non-users or third parties, Kentucky has
joined a number of jurisdictions which extend the Section 402A
protections to bystanders.4" The Kentucky Court has also im-
posed strict liability on a merchant for an injury occurring
before the actual transfer of the product by sale or bailment.
4 2
1g See text accompanying notes 63-66 infra.
10 See generally text accompanying notes 91-98 infra.
42 To date, the § 402A protections have been extended to bystanders in at least
20 jurisdictions. See Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1973)(antici-
pating Utah law); Jorgenson v. Meade Johnson Lab., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (loth Cir.
1973) (anticipating Oklahoma law); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270
(8th Cir. 1972)(anticipating Iowa law); Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970)(antic-
ipating Vermont law); White v. Jeffery Galion, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Ill. 1971);
Klimas v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 937 (D.R.I. 1969); Sills v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Caruth v. Mariani, 463 P.2d
83 (Ariz. App. 1970); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84,75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 517 P.2d 406 (Colo.
App. 1973); Mitchell v. Miller, 214 A.2d 694 (Conn. Super. 1965); Toombs v. Fort
Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968); Peterson v. Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 307
N.E.2d 729 (Ill. App. 1974); Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Lexington, 528
S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1975); Landry v. Adam, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 1973); Piercefield
v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965); Giberson v. Ford Motor Co.,
504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974); Lamendola v. Mizell, 280 A.2d 241 (N.J. Super. 1971);
Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (1973); Howes v. Hanson, 201
N.W.2d 825 (Wis. 1972).
12 Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967); Rogers v. Karem, 405
S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1966). These cases were cited by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals as
supporting the proposition that transfer of possession by sale, bailment, lease, gift or
the like is not a condition precedent to imposition of strict liability. Davis v. Gibson
Prod. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), error ref. n.r.e. 513 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.
1974). Davis was an action brought on behalf of a minor who was injured when he
removed a machete from its sheath in the defendant's self-service store. Noting that
neither of the Kentucky cases had addressed the question of whether there had been
or should be required a sale or delivery of the product the Texas court explored the
basis for imposing liability under § 402A. In light of the'policy considerations of the
strict liability theory, the court interpreted the word "seller" as a term which
"designates a class and [which] is not a designation of limitation." 505 S.W.2d at 690.
Thus, the seller was liable for foreseeable injuries. It is curious that the Kentucky
Court did not cite either the Kroger Co. or the Rogers case as precedent for the
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The absence of privity between the injured plaintiff and a seller
of dangerous goods will have no bearing upon the outcome of
an action based on Section 402A strict liability.
U.C.C. § 2-318 offers three alternatives from which each
state can choose the extent of a seller's liability to third parties
who may be injured by a product. Alternative A of U.C.C. § 2-
318, which has been adopted in Kentucky, 3 abolishes the doc-
trine of horizontal privity for guests and members of the
buyer's household who are personally injured by a defective
product. This alternative does not indicate whether vertical
privity may be required or whether warranties given to the
buyer may extend to a broader class of third-party beneficiar-
ies. The official comments indicate that Alternative A is in-
tended to be neutral and to have no effect on the development
of case law on these issues.4
In Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distributing Co.,45 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals considered the privity question in
the context of an action to recover losses incurred when alleg-
edly defective acetylene gas tanks exploded and caused consid-
erable property damage. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the manufacturer because of lack of privity, but
the Court of Appeals stated that while true contractual liability
requires privity, a products liability claim against a remote
vendor "sounds more in tort than in contract" even if it is
pleaded in warranty.48 In light of policy considerations support-
ing Section 402A, the Court concluded that there is "no valid
basis for requiring privity of contract in a products liability
claim based upon breach of warranty and disregarding privity
in such claims based on negligence. ' 4 If the discussion had
ended on that note, the rule would be clearer, but unfortu-
nately it was clouded by the following statement:
extension of liability to bystanders in Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Lexington,
528 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1975).
13 KRS § 355.2-318.
" U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3. See also U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 2.
45 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966). The cause of action accrued approximately four
months before July 1, 1960, the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
action was grounded in negligence and in warranty. While not cited by the Court, KRS
§ 361.150 presumably was the basis of the warranty claim.
1, 402 S.W.2d at 445.
47 Id.
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We think we would do no judicial violence to hold that the
law in this jurisdiction is that privity is not a prerequisite to
maintenance of an action for breach of implied warranty in
products liability cases, upon the authority and reasoning
enunciated in Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors. However,
we are persuaded to the view expressed in Section 402A of the
American Law Institute's revised Restatement of the Law of
Torts .... 11
The Court thereupon characterized the liability of the immedi-
ate and remote vendors as "strict liability."
Dealers Transport is consistently cited for the proposition
that Kentucky has adopted a rule of strict liability.49 However,
the Court did not hold that warranty actions may be main-
tained in the absence of privity, nor did it hold that privity is
a prerequisite to such an action. The case provides little guid-
ance for the purchaser who discovers the defect before it causes
physical harm but who nevertheless suffers commercial loss
due to his inability to use the product in its dangerous condi-
tion. In such a case the element of physical injury which would
provide a basis for imposing liability under Section 402A is
missing. Since the action would not "sound in tort," Dealers
Transport does not resolve the issue of whether the purchaser
of unfit goods can maintain a warranty action against the re-
mote manufacturer.50
,' Id. at 446 (citation omitted).
" See Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Lexington, 528 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1975);
Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967); Rogers v. Karem, 405 S.W.2d 741
(Ky. 1966); Allen v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1966).
0 The Kentucky Court has not squarely confronted this issue since it decided
Dealers Transport. Belcher v. Hamilton, 475 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1971), involved claims
against the immediate seller and the manufacturer of a frozen food case which failed
to function properly. The freezer was not alleged to have been in a defective condition
which was unreasonably dangerous. The trial court permitted the action against the
manufacturer but directed a verdict in its favor on the basis of its restricted warranty.
The immediate seller was held liable notwithstanding the absence of any proof of
negligence on his part. The issue of whether such an action could be maintained
against the manufacturer was not involved in the appeal. Similarly, Leeper v. Banks,
487 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1972), involved the question of whether notice of a defect given to
the manufacturer was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) in
a suit against the retailer. The notice was held to be inadequate for that purpose. Thus,
the Court had no occasion to decide whether an action grounded in warranty could be
maintained against the manufacturer. This case did, however, involve personal injury
and the plaintiff clearly could have sued the manufacturer in tort. It is clear that the
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One might speculate that the adoption of Section 402A
signals a decision to forego any relaxation of the privity require-
ment in warranty litigation. If that were the case, the only
party who could maintain a warranty action without demon-
strating privity with the defendant seller would be a family
member or guest of the purchaser who had been injured in
person.51 That party would be required, however, to prove the
existence of privity between the defendant seller and the pur-
chaser of the goods.5 2 In other words, the third-party benefici-
ary of the warranty would have a cause of action against the
buyer's immediate seller and no other. When the Court in
Dealers Transport relied upon the nature of the injury to char-
acterize the action as "sounding in tort," it consequently thrust
cases involving the same legal issue back into uncharted wa-
ters. The warranty provisions of Article Two provide a remedy
against a remote seller, but it appears that the Court has cho-
sen to substitute a Section 402A cause of action instead. The
extent to which this judicially recognized theory will pre-empt
further development of warranty law is uncertain.
C.. Standards of Product Acceptability
Formulating a method for determining standards of ac-
ceptable product quality under each theory also remains a
problem under the present approach. U.C.C. § 2-314 sets forth
minimum criteria which goods must satisfy in order to be
deemed merchantable," although these criteria are not in-
tended to be exhaustive.5 1 When a product is found to be defec-
tive so that it is unreasonably dangerous by the standards of
Section 402A, this is tantamount to finding it to be unmer-
chantable as well. The converse, however, is not necessarily
true. For example, a freezer may malfunction and fail to keep
neutral position of the comments to §§ 2-313 and 2-318 leave courts free to extend
warranty liability throughout the distributive chain in such cases.
11 Alternative A to U.C.C. § 2-318 expressly creates such a cause of action. See
also note 67 infra for an explanation of Alternatives A, B and C.
52 Lack of privity with other sellers in the distributive chain would bar the buyer's
recovery in a warranty action if Dealers Transport were so read. Since § 2-318 merely
gives the third-party beneficiary the protections of such warranties as have been ex-
tended to the buyer, the beneficiary of the warranty would also be barred.
See note 8 supra for the text of § 2-314.
, U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 6.
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its contents frozen, in which case it would be unmerchanta-
ble, 5 but that malfunction would not render the freezer unrea-
sonably dangerous to person or property. Moreover, a product
may be found to be unmerchantable in the absence of any
defect. For instance, goods which conform to contract specifi-
cations but which fail to conform to affirmations of fact made
on the label are unmerchantable, even though the contract
may not have required the labeling. 8 Thus, a basic distinction
between warranty and strict tort liability is proof of product
unsuitability in the former case, and proof of a dangerous prod-
uct defect in the latter case.
Notwithstanding the different standards of product ac-
ceptability expressed in U.C.C. § 2-314 and Restatement Sec-
tion 402A, the McMichael Court construed the two provisions
as
expressions of a single basic public policy as to liability for
defective products. If the policy as to Section 402A is that
unavoidable unsafeness of the character involved in the blood
in the instant case is a basis for denying strict liability, it
would seem that the same policy should prevail with respect
to liability under implied warranty."
Application of comment k in blood transfusion cases to deny
recovery in tort is not inconsistent with judicial development
of the doctrine of strict liability in other jurisdictions. However,
the language of U.C.C. § 2-314 makes clear that a product
which is unwholesome or unfit for the purpose for which it is
ordinarily used is definitely unmerchantable. Blood which is
infected with hepatitis virus and which in fact causes hepatitis
clearly is neither wholesome nor fit to be used in a transfusion.
Unlike comment k to Section 402A, which recognizes that
"[t]here are some products which . . . are quite incapable of
being made safe for their intended and ordinary use, [and
which are therefore] not defective,"" the official comments to
U.C.C. § 2-314 specify that "[f]itness for the ordinary pur-
poses for which goods of the type are used is a fundamental
11 See Belcher v. Hamilton, 475 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1972).
'6 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(f). In addition see comment 10 to § 2-314.
532 S.W.2d at 11.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k.
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concept of the present section."59 There is no indication that
the drafters of the Code intended to create exceptions to this
basic standard of merchantability when a defect is difficult or
incapable of discovery. For example, fish contaminated with a
toxin which can cause serious illness if consumed are not mer-
chantable even though no amount of care in handling or pre-
paring the fish would have revealed the presence of the toxin
or eliminated the danger. 0 The relevant criteria under the
Code are the wholesomeness of the product and its fitness for
human consumption, regardless of the social utility of the prod-
uct. Sellers of products containing undiscoverable defects may
avoid the risk of warranty liability only by exercising the power
to disclaim the existence of warranties,"1 by refuting the causal
link between the alleged defect and resulting injury, 2 or by
successfully arguing that the transaction in question is not
within the proper scope of Article Two.
III. THE NATURE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION: SOME
DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The foregoing discussion highlights some of the problems
created by the Kentucky Court's approach to products liability
cases. The importance of unraveling U.C.C. § 2-314 and Re-
U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 8.
See Bronson v. Club Comanche, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 21 (D.V.I. 1968). Even
though the fish was unmerchantable, the plaintiff was denied recovery because she had
assumed the risk. The plaintiff had heard about cases of fish poisoning but neverthe-
less proceeded to order a fish platter. While the policy of § 402A comment k would
not be promoted by treating the unavoidably unsafe fish in the same manner as
unavoidably unsafe blood or vaccine, there is no authority in the text or comments of
Article Two for creating an exception to the rule of liability in either case.
" U.C.C. § 2-316.
42 U.C.C. § 2-714(2) limits damages to the difference between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted,
unless the buyer is able to prove "proximate damages of a different amount." Conse-
quential damages for personal injury or property damages are recoverable if they
proximately result from a breach of warranty. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b). U.C.C. § 2-715,
comment 5 makes clear that an injury occurring after discovery of the defect is not
proximately caused by the defect. This principle is reiterated in § 2-314, comment 13.
Assumption of the risk and misuse of the product negate the causal relationship be-
tween the breach and the injury. Notwithstanding the implications of these comments,
the weight of authority denies contributory negligence as a defense in an action for
breach of warranty. See generally Gregory v. White Truck Equip. Co., 323 N.E.2d 280
(Ind. App. 1975), and cases cited therein. Of course, a person whose conduct, negligent
or otherwise, is the sole cause of the injury cannot establish causation.
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statement Section 402A is not limited to the need for a metho-
dology for formulating appropriate standards of liability. When
warranty actions are characterized as "sounding in tort" the
status of a personal injury action grounded in warranty is left
in confusion. Without a sound analytical foundation upon
which to proceed, an attempt to determine whether a suit is
timely or whether it is barred by the statute of limitations may
be sheer guesswork. The following hypothetical situation illus-
trates the complexity of this problem which has not yet con-
fronted the Kentucky Court.
Assume that B purchases goods from S, a retail merchant,
early in 1976. Shortly thereafter an unknown and unreasonably
dangerous defect causes B to suffer personal injuries. Late in
1977, B files suit against S, the merchant, and M, the manufac-
turer of the defective product, alleging breach of warranty and
strict liability in tort. Since the tort action was filed more than
one year after the accrual of the cause of action, i.e., the date
of injury, both defendants could successfully raise the personal
injury statute of limitations as a bar to the tort claim. Can the
warranty action, however, with less stringent standards of
product acceptability be maintained? It is timely since it is
brought within four years of the accrual of the cause of action,
i. e., date of tender of delivery, but it is also an attempt to
impose liability upon the immediate seller and the manufac-
turer for injuries caused by the defective product. More is in-
volved than simply selecting the appropriate statute of limita-
tions. This problem raises questions of whether the entire pano-
ply of Code rights and remedies is available to the plaintiff, or
whether the language in Kentucky products liability decisions
regarding the tortious nature of such claims will compel an
injured plaintiff to litigate in tort.
There are three distinct but related approaches employed
by courts to determine whether the U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions or a general personal injury or property damage statute
of limitations governs products liability cases. They are charac-
terization of the injury, characterization of the relationship
between the parties, and characterization of the litigation
theory.
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A. Characterization of the Injury
Courts which have held that all actions for personal injury
fall outside of the U.C.C. contend that the distinction between
warranty and strict liability is "more fancied than real." 3 If the
action is "essentially a personal injury action," 4 then liability
is "essentially tort liability"6 5 and the personal injury statute
of limitations must govern the action. These courts conclude
that "the four-year provision of section 2-725 is to apply only
to nonpersonal injury claims otherwise within the scope of the
chapter."66
The drafters of the Code considered the possibility that a
purchaser or user of unmerchantable or unfit goods might suf-
fer personal injury as a result of the product's unfitness. Conse-
quently, they imposed certain limitations upon sellers and af-
forded certain remedies to a limited class of consumers injured
by defective products. There are two limitations on sellers.
First, as long as warranties have not been disclaimed, a seller
may not escape liability for personal injuries to members of the
buyer's family or household who might reasonably be expected
to use, consume, or be affected by the goods.67 Second, a seller
may not limit consequential damages for personal injuries
caused by consumer goods because such a limitation is uncon-
0 Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 286 A.2d 718, 719 (N.J. Super. 1972), af'd, 305 A.2d
412 (N.J. 1973).
" Campbell v. Colt Indus., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 166, 167 (W.D. Va. 1972).
" Abate v. Barkers of Wallingford, Inc., 229 A.2d 366, 369 (Conn. Super. 1967).
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 421 (N.J. 1973). The New Jersey court
held that Article Two was designed to apply to breach of warranty actions involving
injury to person or property only when the action is against the plaintiff's immediate
seller, or when the action is brought by a § 2-318 third-party beneficiary against that
seller. After examining the development of strict liability in New Jersey products
liability cases, the court concluded that application of Article Two to these cases would
result in two different sets of rules for virtually identical claims, depending upon who
is being sued. The court concluded: "When the gravamen is a defect in the article and
consequential personal injury and property damages are sought, they will be taken for
what they actually are, no matter how expressed." 305 A.2d at 427. This statement
effectively eliminates §§ 2-318, 2-715(2)(b), and 2-719(3) from Article Two.
," U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative A. This provision prohibits limitation or disclaimer
of warranties to guests or family members of the purchaser only with respect to per.
sonal injuries. Alternative B, however, extends the protection of warranties to all
persons who may be reasonably expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods,
and who are injured in person. The most expansive provision, Alternative C, incorpo-
rates the broader class of beneficiaries of Alternative B but extends recovery to any
injury caused by breach of the warranty.
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scionable.65 Neither of these limitations, however, prevent a
seller from disclaiming all warranties"9 or contractually modify-
ing or limiting remedies, 70 unless the seller is attempting to
evade all personal injury liability.
In conjunction with these limitations, the drafters created
a statutory remedy for breach of warranty which provides for
recovery of consequential damages in appropriate cases.7' Spe-
cifically, consequential damages include "injury to person or
property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
72
It is significant that the U.C.C. statute of limitations does not
contain any exceptions or special provisos for personal injury
actions arising from a breach of warranty. The inescapable
conclusion is that the drafters intended that some actions for
personal injuries, regardless of whether they sounded in tort or
in contract, would be governed by the Code's substantive pro-
visions, statute of limitations, and elements of pleading and
proof.
B. Characterization of the Relationship Between the Parties
A second approach courts use to determine which theory
governs the products liability case focuses on theoretical dis-
tinctions between sales transactions and tortious conduct. A
sales transaction reflects agreement by the parties, but tort
liability is imposed with no concern for the presence or absence
of an agreeinent or an attempted contractual disclaimer.
73
Although the genesis of strict liability lies in warranty theory,
it is now clear that breach of warranty itself was originally
considered a species of fraud or misrepresentation, sounding
U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
U.C.C. § 2-316.
0 U.C.C. § 2-719. But see McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 347 A.2d 253 (Md. App.
1975); Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 16 (N.J. 1974). The power to limit or modify
remedies is subject to the additional proviso that if an exclusive or limited remedy fails
in its essential purpose the aggrieved party may resort to appropriate Article Two
remedy provisions.
7, U.C.C. § 2-714(3).
71 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b).
13 See Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 235 N.W.2d 570 (Mich. 1975); United States
Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 257 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio 1970);
International Union of Operating Eng'rs. Local 57 v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 258 A.2d
271 (R.I. 1969). See also Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 509 P.2d 529 (Ore. 1973).
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in tort. Even in its present form, strict liability is more nearly
akin to tortious negligence than to contractual warranty, be-
cause no contract is required and because strict liability may
not be disclaimed.
74
Thus, where the parties are not in privity, there is no contrac-
tual relationship upon which warranty liability can be founded.
Courts adopting this approach view the drafters' neutral-
ity on the privity issue75 as explicit recognition that consumers
who are not in privity do not have a warranty remedy against
a manufacturer. 7 Incorporating Code provisions on notice and
disclaimer 77 into personal injury actions is deemed to be unde-
sirable, and the neutral official comments are construed as
tacit authority for further judicial development of the anti-
privity doctrine under theories other than warranty liability.
Since remote sellers are subject to tort liability on the basis of
a duty unrelated to contractual obligations, adoption of Sec-
tion 402A becomes the preferred method of extending a remedy
to a nonprivity purchaser. "In these situations, the Uniform
Commercial Code is inapplicable."78
The availability of tort remedies has led some courts to
conclude that privity is required in the warranty action.
[N]o person injured by a product defect will . . . be denied
a remedy . . . .Sellers of defective products are strictly lia-
ble, without regard to warranties or disclaimers, for personal
injuries proximately caused by the defect . . . .[I]t seems
clear that the remedy in strict liability is available in every
11 Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Alas. 1973) (cita-
tions omitted).
7' See notes 83 and 84 infra.
7, Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 235 N.W.2d 570 (Mich. 1975). "The UCC did not
create a new and separate consumer's product liability claim against a manufacturer."
Id. at 573.
" U.C.C. §§ 2-607(3)(a) and 2-316.
7 Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 62-63 (Wis. 1967). Compare Withers v. Ster-
ling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 878 (S.D. Ind. 1970) with Helvey v. Wabash County
REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. App. 1972), and Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d
581 (6th Cir. 1972)(Ohio law). Also compare United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 257 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio 1970) with Val Decker Packing
Co. v. Corn Prod. Sales Co., 411 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969)(Ohio law); and compare
Hargrove v. Newsome, 470 S.W.2d 348 (Tenn. 1971) with Layman v. Keller Ladders,
Inc., 455 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1970).
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personal injury case involving a breach of implied warranty
of merchantability. 9
It should be noted, however, that reliance upon tort remedies
is misplaced in jurisdictions which have adopted Section 402A.
Proof that a defective product caused physical harm is not
sufficient to sustain recovery in tort; it must also be shown that
the defect was unreasonably dangerous to the person or prop-
erty of the user. 0
Another consderation supporting the privity approach
may be the Code design to establish uniform statute of limita-
tions periods for businesses which operate on a nationwide
scale. However, application of the U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions to consumer actions against remote sellers might elimi-
nate a remedy which would be available if the actions were
characterized as tort claims. A purchaser of defective goods
who suffers personal injury four years after the purchase will
be barred from recovering in warranty, even though the defect
could not have been discovered before the injury occurred. 2
The commercial need for uniformity, therefore, has little rele-
vance in the context of a consumer transaction.
While the drafters expressed neutrality on the privity issue
in the comments to Sections 2-31311 and 2-318,"4 the fair import
" Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Alas. 1973) (cita-
tions omitted). But see Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alas. 1976),
in which the Alaska Supreme Court abolished the requirement of privity in all breach
of warranty actions.
81 The California Supreme Court withdrew its approval of § 402A and rejected the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement because lower courts had already expanded
strict liability beyond the Restatement language. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). In addition, see Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 304 A.2d
562 (N.J. Super. 1973).
11 See Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 238 A.2d 169 (N.J. 1968).
82 U.C.C. § 2-725.
U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 2 states:
[Tihe warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to
disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties
need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such
a contract. . . . The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries
expressly recognize this case law development within one particular area.
Beyond that, the matter is left to the case law with the intention that the
policies of this Act may offer useful guidance in dealing with further cases
as they arise.
84 U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3 states:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provi-
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of those comments is that a further relaxation of the privity
requirement in warranty actions would not violate the statu-
tory scheme. 5 The U.C.C. codifies products liability law under
the label "warranty," and it creates a consumer remedy at least
with respect to the retailer. As a matter of policy, the further
development of warranty law should not be stifled by any un-
certainty in the Code on the issue of how far liability should
extend up the distributive chain. Since implied warranty lia-
bility is not based upon the consensual elements of a transac-
tion but rather arises by operation of law, reliance upon the
absence of the face-to-face agreement which constitutes privity
is misplaced.
Moreover, the privity-conscious approach may lead to an
either/or dilemma. An injured purchaser who is not in privity
has only a tort cause of action which must be brought within a
short time after the injury occurs. But what about the pur-
chaser in privity? Does the fact that he has a true commercial
relationship with his immediate seller indelibly mark his rela-
tionship as "contractual" for purposes of the statute of
limitations? If so, then Section 2-725 does not work well in all
commercial settings, for the purchaser will be in the same situ-
ation these courts have attempted to avoid with the buyer of a
defective product who suffers personal injury more than four
years after tender of delivery. Immutable characterization of
the relationship as contractual would bar recovery against the
immediate seller. 6 What reason is there for denying a pur-
sions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section in this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain. The second alterna-
tive is designed for states where the case law has already developed further
and for those that desire to expand the class of beneficiaries. The third
alternative goes further, following the trend of modern decisions as indicated
by Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1965) in extend-
ing the rule beyond injuries to the person [As amended in 1966].
See note 67, supra for an explanation of the three alternatives.
" It is clear that Alternatives B and C of U.C.C. § 2-318 abolish the requirement
of vertical privity and create a consumer products liability claim against remote par-
ties. See note 67 supra.
" See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490
(1969), a case which characterized the relationship as contractual and foreclosed recov-
ery in tort. The case produced much criticism, (see, e.g., Symposium, Mendel v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 45 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 62 (1970)), and it was subsequently
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chaser a remedy against the immediate seller while allowing
him to recover under Section 402A against a remote manufac-
turer with whom he has had no dealings? This question may
be particularly relevant where the plaintiff is unable to obtain
jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Courts adopting a privity-
conscious approach should therefore be compelled to offer the
purchaser in privity a choice of litigation theories in order to
prevent an unjust result. Once the choice of litigation theories
is allowed, what reasons justify denying the same options to the
plaintiff who sues a remote party? Absent this option of theo-
ries the conduct of trials involving the same substantive issues
may be governed by entirely different sets of rules depending
upon who is sued. A purchaser injured by a defective product
who sued his immediate seller for breach of warranty would
benefit from the less stringent standard of product acceptabil-
ity and the longer statute of limitations, but he would have to
prove the existence of the warranty and notice of its breach. A
Section 402A action against the manufacturer must commence
in shorter time and would require proof that the defective prod-
uct was unreasonably dangerous, but the plaintiff would not
have to abide by the notice and disclaimer provisions of the
Code. Application of different rules in this case makes little
sense, "[a]nd it would, of course, be most awkward and con-
fusing when. . . the manufacturer and retailer are both sued
in the same action. '
8 7
If privity-conscious courts continue to follow this ap-
proach, what are the rights of the Section 2-318 third-party
beneficiary of the warranty? Clearly this party is not in privity
with any seller, yet the drafters abolished the privity require-
ment for this class of plaintiffs. Does the third-party benefici-
ary plead breach of warranty or strict liability in tort? Should
these plaintiffs have a choice of theories in actions against the
immediate seller? When courts decide this question based on
the absence of privity, they offer no guidance regarding the
nature of the beneficiary's cause of action, when it will accrue,
or which statute of limitation will apply. Actually, this prob-
overruled. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1975).
87 Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 426 (N.J. 1973). See note 66 supra.
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lem should arise only in jurisdictions which have adopted Al-
ternative A to Section 2-318, since it is that provision which
restricts the class of beneficiaries. 88 Alternatives B and C
plainly abolish any requirement of vertical privity.59 There is
some evidence, however, that privity-conscious courts may
have difficulty resolving the either/or dilemma even under the
expansive provisions of Alternatives B and C.°
C. Characterization of the Litigation Theory
Rather than focusing on the nature of the injury (personal
or non-personal) or the relationship between the parties (in
privity or not), some courts reach a more satisfactory solution
by simply applying the statute of limitations for whichever
theory is pleaded." Assume that in 1976 a purchaser filed a
complaint alleging that he purchased certain goods from S in
1973; that the goods were unmerchantable and as a result he
was personally injured. The purchaser further alleges that the
defect was not discovered until the injury occurred in 1973 and
that S was promptly notified upon its discovery. The purchaser
argues that he is entitled to consequential damages for personal
injuries as authorized by Section 2-714(3)2 and defined in Sec-
83 See note 67 supra. Comment 2 to § 2-318 nevertheless characterizes the action
as one for breach of warranty.
' See notes 67 and 85 supra.
" For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was confronted with a case in
which the children of the purchaser of an automobile brought suit against the manu-
facturer for personal injuries allegedly caused by a breach of warranty. The children
contended that by virtue of § 2-318 they were subrogated to the rights of their father
to bring the action and that the four-year limitation period in § 2-725 was controlling.
The majority of the court circumvented this argument by stating that regardless of
whether the children had acquired the status of their father, there was no buyer-seller
relationship between the father and the manufacturer and thus no contract of sale. The
majority indicated that this rationale would be controlling regardless of whether § 2-
318 were applied as originally enacted (Alternative A), or as amended (a modified
version of Alternative C which expressly incorporates a manufacturer's warranty).
Hence, any personal injury action maintained by a third-party beneficiary pursuant
to § 2-318 would be governed by the Rhode Island two-year personal injury statute of
limitations. The cause of action accrued prior to the amendment of § 2-318. Kelly v.
Ford Motor Co., 290 A.2d 607 (R.I. 1972).
"1 See, e.g., Reid v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 512 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1975)
(construing Michigan law); Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550 (Ill. 1974);
Redfield v. Meade, Johnson & Co., 512 P.2d 776 (Ore. 1973); Kassab v. Central Soya,
246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968); Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 197 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1964).
,1 U.C.C. § 2-714(3) states: "In a proper case any incidental and consequential
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tion 2-715(2)(a) and (b).13 The complaint states a cause of ac-
tion for breach of warranty, and the action is within the four
year statute of limitations designated in Section 2-725. Courts
which focus upon the nature of the injury 4 would hold that this
constitutes an action for personal injuries and that the shorter
personal injury statute of limitations bars the action. However,
privity-conscious courts would allow the action because the
purchaser is in privity with the seller. The third category of
jurisdictions would permit the action simply because it alleges
a breach of warranty and has been brought within the four-year
period of limitation. This approach is compelling and is sup-
ported in some jurisdictions by the enactment of Section 10-
103, which repeals all legislation inconsistent with the Code.
Some courts have construed this provision to repeal shorter
statutes of limitation if they would control actions for personal
injuries resulting from breach of warranty." This conclusion
has been reached despite statutes which state that "[e]very
suit brought to recover damages for injury wrongfully done to
the person. . . must be brought within two years. . - ."I' The
result is correct in light of Sections 2-725 and 10-103.
Kentucky is among those jurisdictions which have failed
to enact the Code's general repealer. Without an amendment
to the U.C.C. or the general statute of limitations, there is an
apparent conflict between Section 2-725 and the general stat-
ute of limitations for personal injuries. This conflict may be
resolved by traditional principles of statutory construction. A
specific statute which deals with a specific subject should con-
trol over a general law under which that subject might fit. 7
damages under [U.C.C. § 2-715] may also be recovered."
0 U.C.C. § 2-715 states in relevant part:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.
" See text accompanying notes 63-72 supra.
" See, e.g., Sinka v. Northern Commercial Co., 491 P.2d 116 (Alas. 1971).
96 Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 197 A.2d 612, 613 n.3 (Pa. 1964). But see
Tyler v. R.R. St. & Co., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971).
11 Reid v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 512 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1975) (Michigan
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U.C.C. § 2-725 is a specific enactment which relates to actions
for breach of warranty, and recovery of damages for personal
injury is a statutory remedy for breach of warranty. Thus, Sec-
tion 2-725 should be deemed to govern this cause of action.
Article One supports this result by expressing a policy of liberal
construction of Code provisions and an intent to occupy the
field of commercial transactions."
1. Legislative Pre-emption
If a jurisdiction allows recovery under either the warranty
provisions of the U.C.C. or Section 402A, another issue may
arise: Does the fact that the legislature adopted the U.C.C. pre-
empt and therefore bar application of Section 402A? Absent a
contrary expression of legislative intent, statutory and common
law causes of action are not considered exclusive. Likewise,
U.C.C. § 1-103 provides that general principles of law and eq-
uity shall supplement the provisions of the Code unless dis-
placed by particular sections.9 In some instances, a determina-
tion that a supplemental body of law is not displaced may be
made with relative ease. For example, a buyer fraudulently
induced to enter a contract may seek return of the purchase
price, notwithstanding an otherwise effective disclaimer of
warranties which the misrepresentation would have created.' 0
Even if a seller's statements do not create an express warranty
under Section 2-313, "the possibility is left open that a remedy
may be provided by the law relating to fraud or misrepresen-
tation.", 0,
In other contexts, it may be more difficult to determine
when a Code provision is intended to be the exclusive state-
law); Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Prod. Sales Co., 411 F.2d 850 (6th Cir.
1969)(Ohio law); Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 197 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1964).
" Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Prod. Sales Co., 411 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969);
Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 197 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1964).
" U.C.C. § 1-103 specifically lists "the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy or other validating or invalidating cause" as illustrative
of supplemental bodies of law.
'0 See City Dodge, Inc., v. Gardner, 203 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. App. 1974), afi'd 208
S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 1974) (Article Two does not displace tort action for fraud and deceit
in connection with oral representations which induced purchase of automobile).
,01 U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 8.
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ment of law, and the conflicts between Restatement Section
402A and Article Two bring the problem into sharp focus. Offi-
cial comments to Section 2-318 reflect the intent of the drafters
to provide designated third-party beneficiaries the protection
of the buyer's warranty and "to accomplish this purpose with-
out any derogation of any right or remedy resting on negli-
gence."' 2 Although these comments were not made with re-
spect to the development of strict liability in tort, other com-
ments to Section 2-318 clearly contemplate that courts are free
to extend warranty liability up the distributive chain.0 3
It is disturbing that few courts which have adopted Re-
statement § 402A have even considered the possibility that this
conflict exists. Among those which have recognized a potential
conflict, the tendency has been to view the judiciary's preroga-
tives as absolute. In the words of the New Jersey Supreme
Court: "We may parenthetically also observe that, to our
knowledge, no one has ever contended anywhere that adoption
of the Code did away with strict liability in tort."'' 4 This state-
ment was used to justify that court's denying applicability of
the Code's warranty provisions in suits to recover consequential
damages for harm to person or property. This result was
reached even though the legislature amended the general stat-
ute of limitations for property damage and contract claims so
that it did "not apply to any action for breach of any contract
for sale governed by section 12A:2-725 of the New Jersey Stat-
utes."'0 5 The fact that the personal injury statute of limitations
was not similarly amended was viewed as clear legislative in-
tent that Section 2-725 was not designed to apply to personal
injury actions, and this is a defensible conclusion. On the other
hand, it was a distaste for disclaimers and for two sets of rules
regarding litigation for tortious injury that led the court to
characterize all actions for consequential personal injury and
property damage as strict tort actions. "No advantage can be
gained by pleading them in terms of breach of warranty. . ..
We . . . hold that [Section 2-725] does not apply to [such]
actions . . . against the ultimate seller or supplier and that
102 U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 2.
' See notes 83 and 84 supra.
"' Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 427 (N.J. 1973).
10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (1976).
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such actions are governed, like those against a manufacturer,
by our general statutes of limitation." ' 6 While the failure to
amend one statute was significant, it is uncertain whether the
amendment to the statute of limitations for property damage
and contract claims was viewed as having any significance.
Moreover, if one assumes that the court was correct in its appli-
cation of the statutes of limitations, the import of the decision
was that the substantive principles of strict tort liability would
govern the trial of a claim for personal injury or property dam-
age, no matter how pleaded. A refusal to apply the more lenient
standard for unmerchantability to the injured consumer and
third-party beneficiary in an action against the ultimate seller
effectively repeals several provisions of Article Two.107 Nowhere
has it ever been contended that a common law theory repealed
a statute. Conversely, there are courts which recognize parallel
causes of action under Article Two and Restatement § 402A.
They have tended to expand warranty liability in order that it
be coextensive with tort liability. As one author has observed,
"[ult is a topsy-turvy world when a rule of law based upon a
statute must be changed in order to conform with a rule of
common law." ' 8
, 305 A.2d at 427.
, But see Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 16 (N.J. 1974), in which a purchaser
of a defective tire was permitted to recover consequential damages for personal injury
on a theory of express warranty. The court held that in light of the manufacturer's
advertising regarding the safety of its tires and the natural reliance upon such repre-
sentations, the attempt to limit the remedy to repair or replacement of a defective tire
was patently unconscionable. The plaintiff had also asserted an unsuccessful claim in
strict tort. This case is distinguishable from Heavner because the express warranty
could be treated as a true warranty in the "commercial sales sense." Also, the breach
of an express warranty requires proof that the product failed to meet the explicit
representations of the seller rather than proof of a defect or unfitness. The court further
clarified its view in Realmuto v. Struab Motors, Inc., 322 A.2d 440, 444 (N.J. 1974):
[W]hen the gravamen of a consumer suit against a manufacturer or
retailer for consequential personal injuries and property damage is a defect
in the article, the action will be considered as one founded on strict liability
in tort, whether the cause of action is pleaded in express or implied warranty,
in strict liability, or in any combination of these theories.
This is not to say that an injured consumer, who cannot prove or does
not desire to rely entirely on a defect, may not sue, solely or alternatively
under the Uniform Commercial Code for a causally related breach of a perti-
nent express warranty.
"I Titus, supra note 38, at 717.
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D. Running of the Statute of Limitations Against Remote
Parties
In a warranty action to recover for personal injuries or
economic loss, it may be necessary to name a remote vendor
as a defendant because of the intervening insolvency of the
immediate seller. Jurisdictions which characterize the action
as a warranty claim face yet another problem: When does the
statute of limitations begin to run against a remote party?
When he tenders delivery to his immediate purchaser or when
the plaintiff purchases the goods? There are two approaches to
consider in answering this question.
In the first approach, the policy considerations favoring
the elimination of the privity requirement must be analyzed.
Rather than being viewed as an insurer of its goods, the remote
seller is simply identified as a convenient risk bearer in an
integrated marketing chain. This policy seeks to impose re-
sponsibility upon the party placing defective goods in the
stream of commerce with the intent of having the goods come
into the hands of a consumer. Relaxing orthodox contract prin-
ciples merely permits that responsibility to be fixed by the
purchaser who has suffered the loss.
Given this policy, one might argue that the statute of limi-
tations in warranty actions should not begin to run until tender
of delivery of the goods to the ultimate purchaser."9 For exam-
ple, suppose that a parts manufacturer ships defective parts
F.O.B. manufacturer's plant to D, a distributor, in January,
1970. D supplies some of the parts to a wholesaler in January,
1971, who is unable to sell the parts to R, a retailer, until
January, 1972. In February, 1974, a consumer purchases one of
the defective parts and suffers personal injury as a result of the
defect. Later in the year a warranty action is brought against
"D9 Case law on this point is scarce. At least one court has identified tender of
delivery to the ultimate consumer as the latest time that a cause of action could have
accrued without deciding when it actually did accrue. Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co.,
207 A.2d 823 (Pa. 1965). But see, Morton v. Texas Welding & Mfg. Co., 408 F. Supp.
7 (S.D. Tex. 1976). This Texas opinion concluded that § 2-725 was applicable to a
personal injury action arising out of breach of warranty but that the cause of action
accrued in accordance with the personal injury statute of limitations. The court held
the action could be brought within four years of the date of injury under Article Two.
The result is clearly wrong.
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the manufacturer, who pleads that Section 2-725 bars the ac-
tion. The plaintiff will argue that to bar the action would re-
quire the illogical conclusion that his cause of action both ac-
crued and expired prior to his taking delivery of the goods,"10
and that this construction does not promote the policy of af-
fording the ultimate consumer a remedy against the remote
seller of defective goods. This argument overlooks two crucial
points. First, the provision of a remedy and the guarantee of
recovery are not synonymous. Abolition of privity only insures
the injured purchaser a theory by which legal recourse may be
sought. A second flaw in the argument deals with the objection
to barring an action prior to the time when the purchaser could
have discovered the defect. This objection ignores the Code
scheme, which specifies that a cause of action accrues when the
breach occurs despite the fact that the purchaser did not have
knowledge of the breach."' Absent a warranty of the future
performance of the goods, the cause of action always accrues
when tender of delivery is made. Hence, the plaintiff in this
example is in no worse position than a purchaser of goods con-
taining a latent defect which is not discoverable until more
than four years after the purchase.
The second approach to the question of when the statute
of limitations begins to run against a remote party is based
upon close scrutiny of the provisions of the Code and produces
a more sound analysis and consistent result. Since a buyer's
cause of action for breach of warranty normally accrues upon
tender of delivery, it is necessary to determine when and how
tender of delivery is accomplished. Tender requires that the
seller complete his obligations for delivery of the goods."' Gen-
erally, the crucial factors are whether the contract authorizes
or requires the seller to ship the goods and whether the seller
is in possession of the goods. A shipment contract, like the one
in this hypothetical, relieves the seller of further expense and
,,I "[1It is all but unthinkable that a person should be time-barred from prosecut-
ing a cause of action before he ever had one." Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
253 N.E.2d 207, 211, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969)(dissenting opinion), overruled in
Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975). Also
see Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 427 n.15 (N.J. 1973).
'" U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
112 U.C.C. § 2-503.
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risk of loss once he has delivered the goods to the point of
shipment."' The seller tenders delivery when he puts the goods
in the possession of the carrier, makes a proper transportation
contract, obtains and tenders any necessary documents, and
notifies the buyer that the goods have been shipped."'
Application of these principles to the present example
shows that the manufacturer tendered delivery of the goods
when they were placed in the hands of the carrier. It is clear
that the manufacturer had no further delivery obligations. At
this point, the statute of limitations should begin to run against
all parties insofar as the manufacturer's potential warranty
liability is concerned.
Since the manufacturer in the example tendered delivery
of the goods in January 1970, and they were not purchased until
February 1974, the warranty action would be barred. Jurisdic-
tions that apply the statute of limitations of whichever litiga-
tion theory is pleaded would nevertheless permit the plaintiff
to proceed in tort against the manufacturer. As long as the
action is commenced within the limitations period for a per-
sonal injury claim, the bar to pursuit of one theory will not
preclude pursuit of a parallel action." 5 The Code remedy is
distinguishable from, yet supplemental to the tort remedy. '
IV. CONCLUSION
Most courts, in their eagerness to provide a remedy for
consumers who suffer personal injury or property damage, have
HI U.C.C. § 2-319. Under a destination contract, the seller bears the expense of
transportation and the risk of loss until the goods arrive at the named destination.
'" U.C.C. §§ 2-503(2) and 2-504.
M,5 [A] plaintiff who is injured more than four years after the sale of the
defective product, although barred from recovery for breach of warranty in
an action pursuant to the Code, will nevertheless have two years to bring an
action based on strict liability in tort, provided he can show that the defec-
tive product was unreasonably dangerous as required under § 402A.
Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 512 P.2d 776, 779 (Ore. 1973). Accord, Peeke v. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co.,
339 F. Supp. 1385 (M.D. Pa. 1972). In addition, see cases cited in note 116 infra.
,,I See, e.g., Moody v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 324 F. Supp. 844 (S.D. Ga. 1971);
Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alas. 1976); Berry v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 309 N.E.2d 550 (Ill. 1974); Redfield v. Meade, Johnson & Co., 512 P.2d 776 (Ore.
1973); Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 197 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1964); and Layman v.
Keller Ladders, Inc., 455 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1970).
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failed to reflect before reacting. The adoption of Section 402A
in cases argued under a warranty theory117 has made it
"unnecessary" to decide the effect Article Two warranty provi-
sions may have in other contexts"5 and has stifled articulate
debate on the proper relationship of the two theories. "9 Courts
have turned to Section 402A because of its simplicity and their
concern with the notice requirements and the disclaimer and
limitation of remedy provisions of the Code. Although the
seller's Article Two rights may appear to be a barrier to recov-
ery by the unwary consumer, the Official Comments indicate
that a retail consumer is to be judged by more lenient stan-
dards than a merchant buyer. Notice provisions are relaxed for
consumers because "the rule . . . requiring notification is de-
signed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good
faith consumer of his remedy." ' Moreover, a disclaimer of
warranty or limitation of remedy in a consumer transaction can
be attacked as unconscionable. These principles ameliorate the
apparent harshness of the Code scheme, yet the Code remains
an untapped source of products liability law in many jurisdic-
tions.
McMichael v. American Red Cross2' is the latest in a se-
ries of Kentucky cases which blur the very real distinctions
"I "We are fully mindful that plaintiff did not directly plead the theory of strict
tort liability, request the court to instruct on it, nor urge this theory until this appeal."
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 501 (Minn. 1967). See also Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib.
Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305
(N.J. 1965); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Ore. 1967).
M' Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d at 188.
' It has been suggested that without a careful examination of legislative and
judicial precedents regarding the RESTATEMENT within a particular jurisdiction,
"sources of state law on products liability will remain obscure, and, consequently,
choices of law in many states between strict tort liability and warranty rules in prod-
ucts liability cases will continue to be made illegitimately." Titus, supra note 38, at
782. This writer focuses upon the development of products liability law in the special
food warranty cases and identifies Kentucky as one of two jurisdictions in which courts
have held that legislative enactment of the Sales Act was intended to absorb the
common law special food warranty. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Eiseman, 81
S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1935); Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 121 N.E. 471 (N.Y. 1918). "The
reasonable conclusion is that this prior case law established the statutory scheme as
the exclusive remedy for products liability and foreclosed the court from adopting a
scheme outside the Code." Titus, supra note 38, at 778.
'' U.C.C. § 2-607, comment 4. See also comment 5.
,22 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975).
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between the two theories. In McMichael, the plaintiff argued
under alternative theories of strict tort and implied warranty,
yet the Court never addressed the Article Two scope provisions
and proceeded to apply the product quality standards of Sec-
tion 402A without examining pertinent Code standards. The
application of tort theory to causes of action litigated in war-
ranty leaves unanswered the question of how far up the distrib-
utive chain warranty liability may be imposed, and it raises the
possibility that the common law tort theory may pre-empt
comprehensive legislation.
The judicial adoption of Restatement § 402A after legisla-
tive enactment of the U.C.C. should result in the recognition
of two distinct theories of recovery. Section 402A cannot be
held to pre-empt a statutory remedy. Moreover, since the Ken-
tucky Court does not require privity in a products liability
action, purchasers of defective products should be allowed to
proceed in warranty against immediate and remote sellers, re-
gardless of whether the defective condition is characterized as
unreasonably dangerous and regardless of the nature of the
injury sought to be remedied. A parallel cause of action in tort
should also be available if the facts are favorable.
If it is determined that the two theories cannot co-exist
compatibly, there are two alternatives. First, the Court could
reinstate privity requirements in warranty actions. If we con-
tinue to apply Section 402A as well, this change would put
Kentucky squarely in line with privity-conscious jurisdic-
tions.1 22 All products liability claims against remote sellers
would be litigated in tort, while claims against immediate sell-
ers would be grounded in warranty with a possible alternative
remedy in tort.
Second, at least one jurist concluded that courts should no
longer indulge in the assumption that they are free to provide
a tort remedy when statutory relief exists under the U.C.C.
Chief Justice O'Connell of the Oregon Supreme Court wrote
that a bifurcated approach "injects into our law of products
liability complexities which are likely to haunt us in future
cases."123 After reviewing the comprehensive Code provisions,
'22 See text accompanying notes 73-90 supra.
'2 Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 537 (Ore. 1963) (special concurr-
ence of Chief Justice O'Connell). It should be noted that these considerations per-
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he reluctantly concluded that legislative pre-emption had oc-
curred and that "the Code is controlling in this area of the
law. ' ' 24 Although this approach is inconsistent with recent
products liability cases, there is much to be said for the propo-
sition that once the legislature has enacted a statute with no-
tice and disclaimer provisions, "the fact that these require-
ments are ill-fitting does not give [a court] license to purge
them from the statute.
' 'I2
Regardless of one's personal predilections regarding the
proper resolution of this products liability dilemma, it is clear
that an articulated premise upon which Kentucky Courts can
proceed is essential for the development of a cogent body of
jurisprudence.
suaded the New Jersey Supreme Court that the Code was inapplicable in cases involv-
ing defective products, which caused physical harm. See text accompanying note 104
supra.
124 509 P.2d at 536.
1': Id.
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